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Abstract
We consider wireless networks that can be modeled by multiple access channels in which all the terminals
are equipped with multiple antennas. The propagation model used to account for the effects of transmit and
receive antenna correlations is the unitary-invariant-unitary model, which is one of the most general models
available in the literature. In this context, we introduce and analyze two resource allocation games. In both
games, the mobile stations selﬁshly choose their power allocation policies in order to maximize their individual
uplink transmission rates; in particular they can ignore some speciﬁed centralized policies. In the ﬁrst game
considered, the base station implements successive interference cancellation (SIC) and each mobile station
chooses his best space-time power allocation scheme; here, a coordination mechanism is used to indicate to
the users the order in which the receiver applies SIC. In the second framework, the base station is assumed to
implement single-user decoding. For these two games a thorough analysis of the Nash equilibrium is provided:
the existence and uniqueness issues are addressed; the corresponding power allocation policies are determined
by exploiting random matrix theory; the sum-rate efﬁciency of the equilibrium is studied analytically in the low
and high signal-to-noise ratio regimes and by simulations in more typical scenarios. Simulations show that, in
particular, the sum-rate efﬁciency is high for the type of systems investigated and the performance loss due to
the use of the proposed suboptimal coordination mechanism is very small.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In this paper, we consider the uplink of a decentralized network of several mobile stations (MS) and one base
station (BS). This type of network is commonly referred to as the decentralized multiple access channel (MAC).
The network is said to be decentralized in the sense that each user can freely choose his power allocation (PA)
policy in order to selﬁshly maximize a certain individual performance criterion, which is called utility or payoff.
This means that, even if the the BS broadcasts some speciﬁed policies, every user is free to ignore the policy
intended for him if the latter does not maximize his performance criterion.
To the best of the authors’ knowledge, the problem of decentralized PA in wireless networks has been
properly formalized for the ﬁrst time in [1], [2]. Interestingly, this problem can be formulated quite naturally
as a non-cooperative game with different performance criteria (utilities) such as the carrier-to-interference ratio
[3], aggregate throughput [4] or energy efﬁciency [5], [6]. In this paper, we assume that the users want to
maximize information-theoretic utilities and more precisely their Shannon transmission rates. Indeed, the point
of view adopted here is close to the one proposed by the authors of [7] for DSL (digital subscriber lines)
systems, which are modeled as a parallel interference channel; [8] for the single input single output (SISO)
and single input multiple output (SIMO) fast fading MACs with global CSIR and global CSIT (Channel State
Information at the Receiver/Transmitters); [9] for MIMO (Multiple Input Multiple Output) MACs with global
CSIR, channel distribution information at the transmitters (global CDIT) and single-user decoding (SUD) at
the receivers; [10], [11] for Gaussian MIMO interference channels with global CSIR and local CSIT and, by
deﬁnition of the conventional interference channel [12], SUD at the receivers. Note that reference [13] where
the authors considered Gaussian MIMO MACs with neither CSIT nor CDIT differs from our approach and that
of [7], [8], [9], [10], [11] because in [13] the MIMO MAC is seen as a two-player zero-sum game where the
ﬁrst player is the group of transmitters and the second player is the set of MIMO sub-channels. The closest
works to the work presented here are [9] and [14]. Although this paper is in part based on these works, it still
provides signiﬁcant contributions w.r.t. to them, as explained below.
In [9], the authors consider MIMO multiple access channels and assume SUD at the BS; the authors formulate
the PA problem into a team game in which each user chooses his PA to maximize the network sum-rate. In
[14], the same type of decentralized networks is considered but SIC is assumed at the BS. As each user needs
to know his decoding rank in order to adapt his PA policy to maximize his individual transmission rate, a
coordination mechanism has to be introduced: the coordination signal precisely indicates to all the users the
decoding order used by the receiver. The present paper differs from these two contributions on at least four
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important technical points: (i) when SUD is assumed, the PA game is not formulated as a team game but as
a non-cooperative one; (ii) we exploit several proof techniques that are different from [9]; (iii) while [9] and
[14] assume a Kronecker propagation model with common receive correlation we assume here a more general
model, the unitary-invariant-unitary (UIU) propagation model introduced by [21], for which the users can have
different receive antenna correlation proﬁles. This is useful in practice since, for instance, it allows one to
study propagation scenarios where some users can be in line of sight with the BS (the receive antenna are
strongly correlated) whereas other users can be surrounded by many obstacles, which can strongly decorrelate
the receive antennas for these users; (iv) while the authors of [14] restricted their attention to either a purely
spatial PA problem or a purely temporal PA problem, we tackle here the general space-time PA problem.
In this context, our main objective is to study the equilibrium of two power allocation games associated with
the two types of decoding schemes aforementioned (namely SIC and SUD). The motivation for this is that the
existence of an equilibrium allows network designers to predict, with a certain degree of stability, the effective
operating state(s) of the network. Clearly, in our context, uniqueness is a desirable feature of the equilibrium.
As it will be seen, it is possible to prove the existence in both games under investigation. Uniqueness is
proven in the case of SUD while it is conjectured for the case of SIC. In order to establish the corresponding
results, the paper is structured as follows. After presenting the general system model in Sec. II, we analyze
in detail the space-time PA game when SIC and a corresponding coordination mechanism are assumed (Sec.
III). For this game, the existence and uniqueness of the NE are proven and the equilibrium is determined by
exploiting random matrix theory when the numbers of antennas are sufﬁciently large. Its sum-rate efﬁciency
is also analyzed. In Sec. IV, we analyze the case of SUD since this decoding scheme, although suboptimal in
terms of performance (even in the case of a network with single-antenna terminals), has some features that can
be found desirable in some contexts: the receiver complexity is low, there is no need for a coordination signal,
there is no propagation error since the data ﬂows are decoded in parallel and not successively and also it is
intrinsically fair. To analyze the case of the SUD-based PA game, we will follow the same steps as in Sec. III
and we will see that, the equilibrium analysis can be deduced, to a large extent, from the SIC case. Numerical
results are provided in Sec. V to illustrate our theoretical analysis and to better assess the sum-rate efﬁciency
of the considered games. Sec. VI corresponds to the conclusion.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
We assume a MAC with an arbitrary number of users, K ¸ 2. Regarding the original deﬁnition of the
MAC by [15] and [16], the system under consideration has two common features: all transmitters send at once
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and at different rates over the entire bandwidth, and the transmitters are using good codes in the sense of the
Shannon rate. Our system differs from [15][16] in the sense that multiple antennas are considered at the terminal
nodes, channels vary over time and the BS does not dictate the PA policies to the MSs. Also, we assume the
existence of coordination signal which is perfectly known to all the terminals. If the coordination signal is
generated by the BS itself, this induces a certain cost in terms of downlink signaling but the distribution of the
coordination signal can then be optimized. On the other hand, if the coordination signal comes from an external
source, e.g., an FM transmitter, the MSs can acquire their coordination signal for free in terms of downlink
signaling. However this generally involves a certain sub-optimality in terms of uplink rate. In both cases, the
coordination signal will be represented by a random variable denoted by S 2 S. Since we study the K¡user
MAC, S = f0;1;:::;K!g is a (K!+1)¡element alphabet. When the realization is in f1;:::;K!g , the BS applies
SIC with a certain decoding order (game 1). When S = 0 the BS always applies SUD (game 2), where all users
are decoded simultaneously (no interference cancellation). In a real wireless system the frequency at which the
realizations would be drawn would be roughly proportional to the reciprocal of the channel coherence time
(i.e., 1=Tcoh). Note that the proposed coordination mechanism is suboptimal because it does not depend on the
realizations of the channel matrices. We will see that the corresponding performance loss is in fact very small.
We will further consider that each mobile station is equipped with nt antennas whereas the base station has
nr antennas (thus we assume the same number of transmitting antennas for all the users). In our analysis, the
ﬂat fading channel matrices of the different links vary from symbol vector (or space-time codeword) to symbol
vector. We assume that the receiver knows all the channel matrices (CSIR) whereas each transmitter has only
access to the statistics of the different channels (CDIT). The equivalent baseband signal received by the base
station can be written as:
Y (s)(¿) =
K X
k=1
Hk(¿)X
(s)
k (¿) + Z(s)(¿); (1)
where X
(s)
k (¿) is the nt-dimensional column vector of symbols transmitted by user k at time ¿ for the realization
s 2 S of the coordination signal, Hk(¿) 2 Cnr£nt is the channel matrix (stationary and ergodic process) of
user k and Z(s)(¿) is a nr-dimensional complex white Gaussian noise distributed as N(0;¾2Inr). For the sake
of clarity we will omit the time index ¿ from our notations.
In order to take into account the antenna correlation effects at the transmitters and receiver, we will assume
the different channel matrices to be structured according to the unitary-independent-unitary model introduced
in [21]:
8k 2 f1;:::;Kg; Hk = Vk ~ HkWk; (2)
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where Vk and Wk are deterministic unitary matrices that allow one to take into consideration the correlation
effects at the receiver and transmitter. Also ~ Hk is an nr £ nt matrix whose entries are zero-mean independent
complex Gaussian random variables with an arbitrary proﬁle of variances, such that Ej ~ Hk(i;j)j2 =
¾k(i;j)
nt . The
Kronecker propagation model for which the channel transfer matrices factorizes as Hk = R
1=2
k ~ £kT
1=2
k is a
special case of the UIU model where the proﬁle of variances is separable i.e., Ej ~ Hk(i;j)j2 =
d
(R)
k (i)d
(T)
k (j)
nt , with
for each k: £k is a random matrix with zero-mean i.i.d. entries, Tk is the transmit antenna correlation matrix,
Rk is the receive antenna correlation matrix, fd
(T)
k (j)gj2f1;:::;ntg and fd
(R)
k (i)gi2f1;:::;nrg are their associated
eigenvalues. In this paper we will consider that Vk = V for all users. The reason for assuming this will be made
clearer a little further. In spite of this simpliﬁcation, we will still be able to deal with some useful scenarios
where the users see different propagation conditions in terms of receive antenna correlation.
III. SUCCESSIVE INTERFERENCE CANCELLATION
When SIC is assumed at the BS, the strategy of user k 2 f1;2;:::;Kg, consists in choosing the best vector
of precoding matrices Qk =
³
Q
(1)
k ;Q
(2)
k ;:::;Q
(K!)
k
´
where Q
(s)
k = E
h
X
(s)
k X
(s);H
k
i
, for s 2 S, in the sense
of his utility function. For the sake of clarity, we will introduce another notation which will be used in the
remaining of this section to replace the realization s of the coordination signal. We denote by PK the set of
all possible permutations of K elements, such that ¼ 2 Pk denotes a certain decoding order for the K users
and ¼(k) denotes the rank of user k 2 K and ¼¡1 2 PK denotes the inverse permutation (i.e., ¼¡1(¼(k)) = k)
such that ¼¡1(r) denotes the index of the user that is decoded with rank r 2 K. We denote by p¼ 2 [0;1]
the probability that the receiver implements the decoding order ¼ 2 PK, which means that
X
¼2PK
p¼ = 1. At
last note that there is a one-to-one mapping between the set of realizations of the coordination signal S and
the set of permutations PK, i.e., » : S ! Pk such that »(¢) is a bijective function. This is the reason why the
index s can be replaced with the index ¼ without any ambiguity. The vector of precoding matrices is denoted
by Q =
³
Q
(¼)
k
´
¼2PK
and the utility function writtes as:
uSIC
k (Qk;Q¡k) =
X
¼2PK
p¼R
(¼)
k (Q
(¼)
k ;Q
(¼)
¡k) (3)
where
R
(¼)
k (Q
(¼)
k ;Q
(¼)
¡k) = Elog2
¯ ¯
¯ ¯ ¯
¯
I + ½HkQ
(¼)
k HH
k + ½
X
`2K
(¼)
k
H`Q
(¼)
` HH
`
¯ ¯
¯ ¯ ¯
¯
¡ Elog2
¯ ¯
¯ ¯ ¯
¯
I + ½
X
`2K
(¼)
k
H`Q
(¼)
` HH
`
¯ ¯
¯ ¯ ¯
¯
(4)
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with ½ = 1
¾2 and K
(¼)
k = f` 2 Kj¼(`) ¸ ¼(k)g represents, for a given decoding order ¼, the subset of users
that will be decoded after user k. Also, we use the standard notation ¡k , which stands for the other players
than k. An important point to mention here is the power constraint under which the utilities are maximized.
Indeed for user k 2 f1;:::;Kg, the strategy set is deﬁned as follows:
ASIC
k =
½
Qk =
³
Q
(¼)
k
´
¼2PK
j 8¼ 2 PK;Q
(¼)
k º 0;
X
¼2PK
p¼Tr(Q
(¼)
k ) · ntPk
)
: (5)
In order to tackle the existence and uniqueness issues for Nash equilibria in the general space-time PA game,
we exploit and extend the results from Rosen [17], which we will brieﬂy state here below in order to make
this paper sufﬁciently self-contained.
Theorem 1: [17] Let G = (K;fAkgk2K;fukgk2K) be a game where K = f1;:::;Kg is the set of players,
A1;:::;AK the corresponding sets of strategies and u1;:::;uk the utilities of the different players. If the following
three conditions are satisﬁed: (i) each uk is continuous in the all the strategies aj 2 Aj;8j 2 K; (ii) each uk
is concave in ak 2 Ak; (iii) A1;:::;AK are compact and convex sets; then G has at least one NE.
Theorem 2: [17] Consider the K-player concave game of Theorem 1. If the following (diagonally strict
concavity) condition is met: for all k 2 K and for all (a0
k;a00
k) 2 A2
k such that there exists at least one index
j 2 K for which a0
j 6= a00
j,
K X
k=1
(a00
k ¡ a0
k)T £
rakuk(a0
k;a0
¡k) ¡ rakuk(a00
k;a00
¡k)
¤
> 0; then uniqueness of the NE
is insured.
In the space-time power allocation game under investigation, the obtained results are stated in the following
theorem.
Theorem 3: [Existence of an NE] The joint space-time power allocation game described by: the set of
players k 2 f1;2g; the sets of actions ASIC
k and the utility functions uSIC
k (Qk;Q¡k) given in (3), has a Nash
equilibrium.
Proof: It is quite easy to prove that the strategy sets ASIC
k are convex and compact sets and that the utility
functions uSIC
k (Qk;Q¡k) are concave w.r.t. Qk and continuous w.r.t. to (Qk;Q¡k) and by Theorem 1 at least
one Nash equilibrium exists. For more details, the reader is referred to Appendix A.
Theorem 4: [Sufﬁcient condition for uniqueness] If the following condition is met
X
¼2PK
K X
k=1
Tr
n
(Q
(¼)00
k ¡ Q
(¼)0
k )
³
rQ
(¼)
k uSIC
k (Q0
k;Q0
¡k) ¡ rQ
(¼)
k uSIC
k (Q00
k;Q00
¡k)
´o
> 0 (6)
for all Q0
k =
³
Q
(¼)0
k
´
¼2PK
2 ASIC
k , Q00
k =
³
Q
(¼)00
k
´
¼2PK
2 ASIC
k such that (Q0
1;:::;Q0
K) 6= (Q00
1;:::;Q00
K),
then the Nash equilibrium in the power allocation game of Theorem 3 is unique.
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This theorem corresponds to the matrix generalization of the diagonally strict concavity (DSC) condition of
[17] and is proven in Appendix B. To know whether this condition is veriﬁed or not in MIMO MACs, one
needs to re-write it in a more exploitable manner. It can be checked that C expresses as C =
X
¼2PK
p¼T¼ where
for each ¼ 2 PK, T¼ is given by:
T¼ =
K X
k=1
Tr
n
(Q
(¼)00
k ¡ Q
(¼)0
k )
h
rQ
(¼)
k R
(¼)
k (Q
(¼)0
k ;Q
(¼)0
¡k ) ¡ rQ
(¼)
k R
(¼)
k (Q
(¼)00
k ;Q
(¼)00
¡k )
io
= E
K X
r=1
Tr
n
½H¼¡1(r)(Q
(¼)00
¼¡1(r) ¡ Q
(¼)0
¼¡1(r))HH
¼¡1(r)
2
4
Ã
I + ½H¼¡1(r)Q
(¼)0
¼¡1(r)HH
¼¡1(r) + ½
K X
s=r+1
H¼¡1(s)Q
(¼)0
¼¡1(s)HH
¼¡1(s)
!¡1
¡
Ã
I + ½H¼¡1(r)Q
(¼)00
¼¡1(r)HH
¼¡1(r) + ½
K X
s=r+1
H¼¡1(s)Q
(¼)00
¼¡1(s)HH
¼¡1(s)
!¡13
5
9
=
;
= E
K X
r=1
Tr(A(¼)00
r ¡ A(¼)0
r )
2
4
Ã
I +
K X
s=r
A(¼)0
r
!¡1
¡
Ã
I +
K X
s=r
A(¼)00
r
!¡13
5
(7)
where A
(¼)0
r = ½H¼¡1(r)Q
(¼)0
¼¡1(r)HH
¼¡1(r), A
(¼)00
r = ½H¼¡1(r)Q
(¼)00
¼¡1(r)HH
¼¡1(r) and the users have been ordered
using their decoding rank rather than their index.
Theorem 5: [A sufﬁcient condition for DSC] If for any positive deﬁnite matrices Ai, Bi, Ai 6= Bi, i 2
f1;:::;Kg we have that
K X
i=1
Tr
8
<
:
(Ai ¡ Bi)
2
4
0
@
i X
j=1
Bj
1
A
¡1
¡
0
@
i X
j=1
Aj
1
A
¡13
5
9
=
;
> 0; (8)
then the DSC condition is met: C > 0.
Our conjecture is that the trace inequality (8) always holds for any K et for any positive matrices.
Conjecture 6: [Trace inequality] For any positive deﬁnite matrices Ai, Bi, Ai 6= Bi, i 2 f1;:::;Kg we have
that
K X
i=1
Tr
8
<
:
(Ai ¡ Bi)
2
4
0
@
i X
j=1
Bj
1
A
¡1
¡
0
@
i X
j=1
Aj
1
A
¡13
5
9
=
;
> 0: (9)
Said otherwise, we conjecture that there is a unique NE in the space-time power allocation game with SIC.
This conjecture is based on at least three arguments: (i) we know from [27] that it is true for K = 2 and an
arbitrary pair (nt;nr); (ii) we have proven in Appendix that it is true for K arbitrary and (nt;nr) = (1;1);
(iii) an extensive numerical analysis has shown that it is true in all the tested scenarios.
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Determination of the Nash equilibrium. In order to ﬁnd the optimal covariance matrices, we proceed in the
same way as described in [9]. First we will focus on the optimal eigenvectors and then we will determine the
optimal eigenvalues by approximating the utility functions under the large system assumption.
Theorem 7: [Optimal eigenvectors] For all k 2 K, Qk 2 ASIC
k there is no loss of optimality by imposing
the structure Qk = (Qk
(¼))¼2PK, Q
(¼)
k = WkPk
(¼)Wk
H, in the sense that:
max
Qk2ASIC
k
uSIC
k (Qk;Q¡k) = max
Qk2SSIC
k
uSIC
k (Qk;Q¡k);
where SSIC
k =
n
Qk = (Qk
(¼))¼2Pk 2 ASIC
k jQ
(¼)
k = WkP
(¼)
k WH
k
o
, s 2 S, model from (2) and P
(s)
k =
Diag(P
(¼)
k (1);:::;P
(¼)
k (nt)).
The detailed proof of this result is given in Appendix D. This result, although easy to obtain, it is instrumental
in our context for two reasons. First, the search of the optimum precoding matrices boils down to the search of
the eigenvalues of these matrices. Second, as the optimum eigenvectors are known, available results in random
matrix theory can be exploited to ﬁnd an accurate approximation of these eigenvalues. Indeed, the eigenvalues
are not easy to ﬁnd in the ﬁnite setting. They might be found using numerical techniques based on extensive
search. Here, our approach consists in approximating the utilities in order to obtain expressions which are not
only easier to interpret but also easier to be optimized w.r.t. the eigenvalues of the precoding matrices. The key
idea is to approximate the different transmission rates by their large-system equivalent in the regime of large
number of antennas. The corresponding approximates can be found to be accurate even for relatively small
number of antennas (see e.g., [18][19] for more details).
Since we have assumed Vk = V, we can exploit the results in [20][21] for single-user MIMO channels,
assuming the asymptotic regime in terms of the number of antennas: nr ! 1, nt ! 1, nr
nt ! ¯. The
corresponding approximated utility for user k is:
~ uSIC
k (fP
(¼)
k gk2K;¼2PK) =
X
¼2PK
p¼ ~ R
(¼)
k (P
(¼)
k ;P
(¼)
¡k) (10)
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where
~ R
(¼)
k (P
(¼)
k ;P
(¼)
¡k) =
1
nr
X
`2K
(¼)
k [fkg
nt X
j=1
log2
³
1 + (N
(¼)
k + 1)½P
(¼)
` (j)°
(¼)
` (j)
´
+
1
nr
nr X
i=1
log2
0
@1 +
1
(N
(¼)
k + 1)nt
X
`2K
(¼)
k [fkg
nt X
j=1
¾`(i;j)±
(¼)
` (j)
1
A¡
1
nr
X
`2K
(¼)
k [fkg
nt X
j=1
°
(¼)
` (j)±
(¼)
` (j)log2 e¡
1
nr
X
`2K
(¼)
k
nt X
j=1
log2
³
1 + N
(¼)
k ½P
(¼)
` (j)Á
(¼)
` (j)
´
¡
1
nr
nr X
i=1
log2
0
@1 +
1
N
(¼)
k nt
X
`2K
(¼)
k
nt X
j=1
¾`(i;j)Ã
(¼)
` (j)
1
A+
1
nr
X
`2K
(¼)
k
nr X
j=1
Á
(¼)
` (j)Ã
(¼)
` (j)log2 e
(11)
where N
(¼)
k = jK
(¼)
k j and the parameters °
(¼)
k (j) and ±
(¼)
k (j) 8j 2 f1;:::;ntg, k 2 K, ¼ 2 PK are the solutions
of: 8
> > > > > > > > > > <
> > > > > > > > > > :
8j 2 f1;:::;ntg;` 2 K
(¼)
k [ fkg :
°
(¼)
` (j) =
1
(N
(¼)
k + 1)nt
nr X
i=1
¾`(i;j)
1 + 1
(N
(¼)
k +1)nt
X
r2K
(¼)
k [fkg
nt X
m=1
¾r(i;m)±(¼)
r (m)
±
(¼)
` (j) =
(N
(¼)
k + 1)½P
(¼)
` (j)
1 + (N
(¼)
k + 1)½P
(¼)
` (j)°
(¼)
` (j)
;
(12)
and Á
(¼)
` (j), Ã
(¼)
` (j), 8j 2 f1;:::;ntg and ¼ 2 PK are the unique solutions of the following system:
8
> > > > > > > > > > <
> > > > > > > > > > :
8j 2 f1;:::;ntg;` 2 K
(¼)
k :
Á
(¼)
` (j) =
1
N
(¼)
k nt
nr X
i=1
¾`(i;j)
1 + 1
N
(¼)
k nt
X
r2K
(¼)
k
nt X
m=1
¾r(i;m)Ã(¼)
r (m)
Ã
(¼)
` (j) =
N
(¼)
k ½P
¼)
` (j)
1 + N
(¼)
k ½P
(¼)
` (j)Á
(¼)
` (j)
:
(13)
The corresponding water-ﬁlling solution is:
P
(¼);NE
k (j) =
"
1
ln2nr¸k
¡
1
N
(¼)
k ½°
(¼)
k (j)
#+
; (14)
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where ¸k ¸ 0 is the Lagrangian multiplier tuned in order to meet the power constraint:
X
¼2PK
nt X
j=1
p¼
"
1
ln2nr¸k
¡
1
N
(¼)
k ½°
(¼)
k (j)
#+
= ntPk:
Note that to solve the system of equations given above, we can use the same iterative power allocation algorithm
as the one described in [9].
At this point, an important point has to be mentioned. The existence and uniqueness issues have be analyzed
in the ﬁnite setting (exact game) whereas the determination of the NE is performed in the asymptotic regime
(approximated game). It turns out that large system approximates of ergodic transmission rates have the same
properties as their exact counterparts, as shown recently by [23], which therefore ensures the existence and
uniqueness of the NE in the approximated game.
Nash Equilibrium efﬁciency. In order to measure the efﬁciency of the decentralized network w.r.t. its cen-
tralized counterpart we introduce the following quantity:
SRE =
RNE
sum
Csum
· 1; (15)
where SRE stands for sum-rate efﬁciency; the quantity RNE
sum represents the sum-rate of the decentralized network
at the Nash equilibrium, which is achieved for certain choices of coding and decoding strategies; the quantity
Csum corresponds to the sum-capacity of the centralized network, which is reached only if the optimum coding
and decoding schemes are known. Note that this is the case for the MAC but not for other channels like the
interference channel. Obviously, the efﬁciency measure we introduce here is strongly connected to the price
of anarchy [24] (POA). The difference between SRE and POA is subtle. In our context, information theory
provides us with fundamental physical limits on the social welfare (network sum-capacity) while in general no
such upper bound is available. In our case, the sum-capacity is given by:
Csum = max
(­1;:::;­K)2A(C) Elog
¯
¯ ¯ ¯
¯
I + ½
K X
k=1
Hk­kHH
k
¯
¯ ¯ ¯
¯
; (16)
with
A(C) =
©
(­1;:::;­K)j8k 2 K;­k º 0;­k = ­H
k ;Tr(­k) · ntPk
ª
: (17)
In general, it is not easy to ﬁnd a closed-form expression of the SRE. This is why we will respectively analyze
the SRE in the regimes of high and low signal-to-noise ratio (SNR), and for intermediate regimes simulations
will complete our analysis. It turns out that the SRE tends to 1 in the two mentioned extreme regimes, which
is the purpose of what follows.
July 20, 2009 DRAFT11
In the high SNR regime, where ½ ! 1, we observe from (12) that ±
(¼)
` (j) ! 1
°
(¼)
` (j). Under this condition, it
is easy to check that by setting the derivatives of Lk w.r.t. P
(s)
k (j) to zero, we obtain that the power allocation
policy at the NE is the uniform power allocation P
(¼);NE
k = PkI, regardless the realization of the coordination
signal S. Furthermore, in the high SNR regime, the sum-capacity is achieved by the uniform power allocation.
Thus, we obtain that the gap between the NE achievable sum-rate and the sum-capacity is optimal, SRE = 1
for any distribution of S.
In the low SNR regime, where ½ ! 0, from (12) we obtain that ±
(¼)
` (j) ! 0 and that °
(¼)
` (j) = 1
(N
(¼)
k +1)nt
nr X
i=1
¾`(i;j).
By approximating ln(1 + x) ¼ x when x << 1, the power allocations policies at the NE are the solutions of
the following linear programs:
max
fP
(¼)
k (j)g1·j·nt
nt X
j=1
8
<
:
X
p¼2PK
¼P
(¼)
k (j)
nr X
i=1
¾1(i;j)
9
=
;
s.t.
nt X
j=1
X
¼2PK
P
(¼)
k (j) · Pknt
; (18)
given by:
X
¼2PK
p¼P
(¼);NE
k (j) =
¯
¯ ¯ ¯
¯ ¯ ¯
¯
ntPk if j = arg max
1·m·nt
nr X
i=1
¾k(i;m)
0 otherwise
: (19)
The optimal power allocation that achieves the sum-capacity is equal to the equilibrium power allocation,
P¤
k =
P
¼2PK p¼P
(¼);NE
k (j) Thus, the achievable sum-rate at the NE is equal to the centralized upper bound
and thus SRE = 1 for any distribution of S. In conclusion, when either the low or high SNR regime is
assumed, the sum-capacity of the fast fading MAC is achieved at the NE although a sub-optimum coordination
mechanism is assumed and also regardless of the distribution of the coordination channel.
IV. SINGLE USER DECODING
In this section the coordination signal is deterministic (namely Pr[S = s] = ±(s), ± being the Kronecker
symbol) and therefore the amount of downlink signalling the BS needs in order to indicate to the MSs that it is
using SUD can be made arbitrary small (by letting the frequency at which the realizations of the coordination
signal are drawn tend to zero). In this framework, each user has to optimize only one precoding matrix. Indeed,
the strategy of user k 2 K, consists in choosing the best precoding matrix Q
(0)
k = E
h
X
(0)
k X
(0)H
k
i
, in the sense
of his utility function obtained with SUD:
uSUD
k (Q
(0)
k ;Q
(0)
¡k) = Elog
¯
¯ ¯ ¯
¯ ¯
I + ½HkQ
(0)
k HH
k + ½
X
`6=k
H`Q
(0)
` HH
`
¯
¯ ¯ ¯
¯ ¯
¡ Elog
¯
¯ ¯ ¯
¯ ¯
I + ½
X
`6=k
H`Q
(0)
` HH
`
¯
¯ ¯ ¯
¯ ¯
(20)
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. The strategy set of user k becomes
ASUD
k =
n
Q
(0)
k º 0;Q
(0)
k = Q
(0);H
k ;Tr(Q
(0)
k ) · ntPk
o
: (21)
It turns out that the equilibrium analysis in the game with SUD can be, to a large extent, deduced from the
game with SIC. For this reason, we will not detail the corresponding proofs. The existence and uniqueness
issues are given in the following theorem.
Theorem 8: [Existence and uniqueness of an NE] The space power allocation game described by: the set
of players k 2 K; the sets of actions ASUD
k and the payoff functions uSUD
k (Q
(0)
k ;Q
(0)
¡k) given in (20), has a
unique Nash equilibrium.
To prove the existence of a Nash equilibrium we also exploit Theorem 1 and the four necessary conditions
on the utility functions and strategy sets can be veriﬁed using the same tools as described in Appendix A.
Uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium. Here we can specialize Theorem 4, which is the matrix extension of
Theorem 2. When the strategies sets are not sets of pairs of matrices but only sets of matrices, the diagonally strict
concavity condition in (6) can be written as follows. For all Q
(0)0
k ;Q
(0)00
k 2 ASUD
k such that (Q
(0)0
1 ;:::;Q
(0)0
K ) 6=
(Q
(0)00
1 ;:::;Q
(0)00
K ):
C =
K X
k=1
Tr
n
(Q
(0)00
k ¡ Q
(0)0
k )
h
rQ
(0)
k u1(Q
(0)0
k ;Q
(0)0
k ) ¡ rQ
(0)
k u1(Q
(0)00
k ;Q
(0)00
k )
io
: (22)
Now we can evaluate C in the same way as in Appendix C and we obtain that:
C =
K X
k=1
Tr
8
<
:
h
½Hk(Q
(0)0
k ¡ Q
(0)00
k )HH
k
i
2
4
Ã
I + ½
K X
`=1
H`Q
(0)00
` HH
`
!¡1
¡
Ã
I + ½
K X
`=1
H`Q
(0)0
` HH
`
!¡13
5
9
=
;
= Trf(A
0
¡ A
00
)[(A
00
)¡1 ¡ (A
0
)¡1]g;
(23)
which is strictly positive for all A
0
6= A
00
, A
0
Â 0, A
00
Â 0 after [27] applied when K = 1. This result can be
applied here since we have
A
0
= I + ½
K X
`=1
H`Q
(0)0
` HH
`
A
00
= I + ½
K X
`=1
H`Q
(0)00
` HH
` :
Determination of the Nash equilibrium. As for the optimal eigenvectors of the covariance matrices, we follow
the same lines as in Appendix D. In this case also there is no loss of optimality by choosing the covariance
matrices Q
(0)
k = WkP
(0)
k WH
k , where Wk is the same unitary matrix as in (2) and Pk is the diagonal matrix
containing the eigenvalues of Q
(0)
k .
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Here also we further exploit the asymptotic results for the MIMO channel given in [20] [21]. The approximated
utility for user k is:
~ uSUD
k (P
(0)
k ;P
(0)
¡k) =
1
nr
K X
k=1
nt X
j=1
log2(1 + K½P
(0)
k (j)°k(j))+
1
nr
nr X
i=1
log2
0
@1 +
1
Knt
K X
k=1
nt X
j=1
¾k(i;j)±k(j)
1
A¡
1
nr
K X
k=1
nt X
j=1
°k(j)±k(j)log2 e¡
1
nr
X
`6=k
nt X
j=1
log2(1 + (K ¡ 1)½P
(0)
` (j)Á`(j))¡
1
nr
nr X
i=1
log2
0
@1 +
1
(K ¡ 1)nt
X
`6=k
nt X
j=1
¾`(i;j)Ã`(j)
1
A+
1
nr
X
`6=k
nr X
j=1
Á`(j)Ã`(j)log2 e
(24)
where the parameters °k(j) and ±k(j) 8j 2 f1;:::;ntg, k 2 f1;2g are solution of:
8
> > > > > > > > > > <
> > > > > > > > > > :
8j 2 f1;:::;ntg;k 2 K :
°k(j) =
1
Knt
nr X
i=1
¾k(i;j)
1 + 1
Knt
K X
`=1
nt X
m=1
¾`(i;m)±`(m)
±k(j) =
K½P
(0)
k (j)
1 + K½P
(0)
k (j)°k(j)
:
(25)
and Á`(j), Ã`(j), 8j 2 f1;:::;ntg are the unique solutions of the following system:
8
> > > > > > > > > > <
> > > > > > > > > > :
8j 2 f1;:::;ntg;` 2 K n fkg :
Á`(j) =
1
(K ¡ 1)nt
nr X
i=1
¾`(i;j)
1 + 1
(K¡1)nt
X
r6=k
nt X
m=1
¾r(i;m)Ãr(m)
Ã`(j) =
(K ¡ 1)½P
(0)
` (j)
1 + (K ¡ 1)½P
(0)
` (j)Á`(j)
:
(26)
The corresponding water-ﬁlling solution is:
P
(0);NE
k (j) =
·
1
ln2nr¸k
¡
1
K½°k(j)
¸+
; (27)
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where ¸k ¸ 0 is the Lagrangian multiplier tuned in order to meet the power constraint:
nt X
j=1
·
1
ln2nr¸k
¡
1
K½°k(j)
¸+
=
ntPk.
In what the efﬁciency of the NE point is concerned, we already know that the SUD decoding technique
is sub-optimal in the centralized case (SUD does allow the network to operate at an arbitrary point of the
centralized MAC capacity region) and it is impossible to reach the sum-capacity Csum even if the high and low
SNR regime are assumed.
V. SIMULATION RESULTS
In what follows, we assume the regime of large numbers of antennas. From [9], [20], [21], we know that
the approximates of the ergodic achievable rates in the asymptotic regime are accurate even for relatively small
number of antennas. For the channel matrices, we assume the Kronecker model Hk = R
1=2
k £kT
1=2
k mentioned
in Sec. II, where the receive and transmit correlation matrices Rk, Tk follow an exponential proﬁle characterized
by the correlation coefﬁcients (see e.g., [25], [26]) r = [r1;r2] and t = [t1;t2] such that Rk(i;j) = r
ji¡jj
k ,
Tk(i;j) = t
ji¡jj
k . By assuming that the receive antenna is a uniform linear array (ULA) and knowing that, when
the dimensions of Toeplitz matrices increase they can be approximated by circular matrices we obtain that all
the receive correlation matrices Rk can be diagonalized in the same vector basis (i.e., the Fourier basis). Thus
the considered model is included in the UIU model that we studied where Vk = V.
Fair SIC decoding versus SUD decoding. First we compare the results of the general space-time PA game
considered in Sec. III, where SIC decoding is used at the receiver, and the game described in Sec. IV, where
SUD decoding is used. Fig. 1 depicts the achievable sum-rate at the equilibrium as a function of the transmit
power P1 = P2 = P, for the scenario nr = nt = 10, r = [0:5;0:2], t = [0:5;0:2], ½ = 3dB. In order to have a
fair comparison we assume that p = 1
2 (on average each user is decoded second half of the time when SIC is
assumed). We observe that, even in this scenario, which was thought to be a bad one in terms of sub-optimality,
the sum-rate obtained with the ﬁrst game is very close to the sum-capacity upper bound. Also, the sum-rate
reached when the BS uses SUD is clearly much lower than the sum-rate obtained by using SIC.
SIC decoding, comparison between the joint space-time PA and the special cases of spatial PA and temporal
PA. Now we want to compare the results of the general space-time PA with the two particular cases that were
studied in [14]: the spatial PA, where the users are forced to allocate their power uniformly over time (regardless
of their decoding rank) but are free to allocate their power over the transmit antennas; the temporal PA, where
the users are forced to allocate their power uniformly over their antennas but they can adjust their power as
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a function of the decoding rank at the receiver. Fig. 2 represents the sum-rate efﬁciency as a function of the
coordination signal distribution parameter p 2 [0;1] when nr = nt = 10, r = [0:3;0], t = [0:5;0:2], ½ = 4dB,
P1 = 5, P2 = 50. We observe that the three types of power allocation policies perform very close to the upper
bound. What is most interesting is the fact that the performance of the network at the equilibrium is better by
using a purely spatial PA instead of the most general space-time PA. This has been conﬁrmed by many other
simulations and illustrates a Braess paradox: although the sets of strategies for the space-time case include
those of the purely spatial case, the performance obtained at the NE are not better in the space-time case.
SIC decoding, spatial PA, achievable rate region. In Fig. 3, we observe that the rate region achieved at the
NE of the space PA as a function of the distribution of the coordination signal p for the scenario nr = nt = 10,
r = [0:4;0:2], t = [0:6;0:3], ½ = 3dB, P1 = 5, P2 = 50. It is quite remarkable that in large MIMO MACs, the
capacity region comprises a full cooperation segment just like the SISO MACs. The coordination signal precisely
allows one to move along the corresponding line. This shows the relevance of large systems in decentralized
networks since they allow to determine the capacity region of certain systems whereas it is unknown in the
ﬁnite setting. Furthermore, they induce an averaging effect, which makes the users’ behavior predictable.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we have addressed four important features for Nash equilibria in MIMO multiple access channels:
existence, uniqueness, determination, and efﬁciency. In the power allocation with single-user decoding at the
receiver, all of these features are fully analyzed. For the game with successive interference cancellation, only
the second one is analyzed partially. Indeed, uniqueness relies on a conjecture in this case; this conjecture
corresponds to a non-trivial trace inequality. We provide strong arguments sustaining this conjecture. Concerning
simulation results, note that for all types of power allocation policies (purely temporal PA, purely spatial PA,
space-time PA), the sum-rate efﬁciency of the decentralized network is close to one when SIC is assumed
and the network is coordinated by the proposed suboptimal coordination mechanism. Quite surprisingly, the
space-time power allocation performs a little worse than its purely spatial counterpart, which puts in evidence a
Braess paradox in the types of wireless networks under consideration. One of the interesting extensions of this
work would be to analyze the impact of a non-perfect successive interference cancellation on the PA problem.
Indeed, the effect of error propagation could then be assessed (which does not exist with single-user decoding).
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APPENDIX A
A. Concavity of the utility functions uSIC
k
Let us focus on user k 2 K. We want to prove that uSIC
k (Qk;Q¡k) is concave w.r.t. Qk 2 ASIC
1 . We observe
that the term R
(¼)
k (Q
(¼)
k ;Q
(¼)
¡k) in (3) depends only on Q
(¼)
k and Q
(¼)
¡k and not on the covariance matrices Q
(¿)
k ,
Q
(¿)
¡k for any other possible decoding rule ¿ 2 PK nf¼g. Thus, in order to prove that uSIC
k (Qk;Qk) is strictly
concave w.r.t. to Qk = (Q
(¼)
k )¼2PK, it sufﬁces to prove that R
(¼)
k (Q
(¼)
k ;Q
(¼)
¡k) is concave w.r.t. Q
(¼)
k for all
¼ 2 PK.
To this end, we study the concavity of the function f(¸) = R
(¼)
k (¸Q
(¼)0
k + (1 ¡ ¸)Q
(¼)00
k ) over the interval
[0;1] for any pair of matrices (Q
(¼)0
k ;Q
(¼)00
k ). The second derivative of f is equal to:
@2f
@¸2(¸) = ¡ETr
2
4½2HH
k
0
@I + ½HkQ
(¼)00
k HH
k + ½¸Hk¢Q
(¼)
k HH
k + ½
X
`2K
(¼)
k
H`Q
(¼)
` HH
`
1
A
¡1
Hk¢Q
(¼)
k
£HH
k
0
@I + ½HkQ
(¼)00
k HH
k + ½¸Hk¢Q
(¼)
k HH
k + ½
X
`2K
(¼)
k
H`Q
(¼)
` HH
`
1
A
¡1
Hk¢Q
(¼)
k
3
5
= ¡ETr[A¢Q
(¼)
k A¢Q
(¼)
k ]
;
with A = ½2HH
k
0
@I + ½HkQ
(¼)00
k HH
k + ½¸Hk¢Q
(¼)
k HH
k + ½
X
`2K
(¼)
k
H`Q
(¼)
` HH
`
1
A
¡1
Hk, which can be proven
to be a Hermitian positive deﬁnite matrix, ¢Q
(¼)
k = Q
(¼)0
k ¡ Q
(¼)00
k also a Hermitian matrix, and ½ = 1
¾2.
@2f
@¸2(¸) = ¡ETr[A1=2¢Q
(¼)
k A1=2A1=2¢Q
(¼)
k A1=2]
= ¡ETr[BBH] < 0
;
with B = A1=2¢Q
(¼)
k A1=2.
B. Continuity of the utility functions uSIC
k
Considering the Leibniz formula, the determinant of a matrix can be expressed as a weighted sum of products
of its entries. Knowing that the product and the sum of continuous functions are continuous, we conclude that
the determinant function is continuous. Also, it is well known that the logarithmic function is a continuous
function. Thus, for any ¼ 2 PK, the function R
(¼)
k (Q
(¼)
k ;Q
(¼)
¡k) is nothing else but the composition of two
continuous functions which is also continuous w.r.t. (Q
(¼)
k ;Q
(¼)
¡k). This sufﬁces to prove that uSIC
k (Qk;Q¡k)
is continuous w.r.t. (Qk;Q¡k).
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C. Convexity of the strategy sets ASIC
k
In order to prove that the set ASIC
k is convex, we need to verify that, for any two matrices (Q
0
k;Q
00
k) 2
ASIC
k £ ASIC
k , we have:
®Q
0
1 + (1 ¡ ®)Q
00
1 2 ASIC
k ;
for all ® ¸ 0.
For any Q
0
k;Q
00
k 2 A
(SIC)
k , the matrices Q
(¼)
k are Hermitian which implies that ®Q
(¼)0
k + (1 ¡ ®)Q
(¼)00
k are
also Hermitian matrices, for all ¼ 2 PK.
Furthermore, for any Q
0
k;Q
00
k 2 ASIC
k , we have that Q
(¼)0
k , Q
(¼)00
k are non-negative matrices which implies
that ®Q
(¼)0
k + (1 ¡ ®)Q
(¼)00
k are also non-negative matrices, for all ¼ 2 PK.
Finally, knowing that the trace is a linear application we have that:
X
¼2Pk
p¼Tr
³
®Q
(¼)0
k + (1 ¡ ®)Q
(¼)00
k
´
=
= ®
X
¼2Pk
p¼Tr(Q
(¼)0
k ) + (1 ¡ ®)
X
¼2Pk
p¼Tr(Q
(¼)0
k )
· ®ntPk + (1 ¡ ®)ntPk
= ntPk:
Thus ®Q
0
k + (1 ¡ ®)Q
00
k 2 ASIC
k and the set is convex.
D. Compactness of the strategy sets ASIC
k
To prove that the strategy sets are compact sets we use the fact that, in ﬁnite dimension spaces, a closed and
bounded set is compact.
First let us prove that ASIC
k is a closed set. We deﬁne the function g : ASIC
k ¡! [0;ntPk], with
f(Qk) =
X
¼2PK
p¼Tr(Q
(¼)
k ):
We see that g(¢) is a continuous function and that its image is a compact and thus closed set. Knowing that
the continuous inverse image of a closed set is closed, we conclude that ASIC
k is closed.
Now we want to prove that the set ASIC
k is a bounded set. We associate to the t-uple of matrices (Q
(¼)
k )¼2PK
the following norm jjQkjj =
s X
¼2PK
jjQ
(¼)
k jj2
2 where jj:jj2 is the spectral norm of a matrix.
jjQ
(¼)
k jj2 =
q
maxf¸Q
(¼)H
k Q
(¼)
k (i)gn
i=1:
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Since for all Qk 2 ASIC
k , Q
(¼)
k is a non-negative, Hermitian matrix we have that:
maxf¸Q
(¼)
k (i)gn
i=1 · Tr(Q
(¼)
k ) · 1;
and thus:
jjQ
(¼)
k jj2 =
q
maxf¸Q
(¼)2
k (i)gn
i=1 =
q
maxf¸Q
(¼)
k (i)
2gn
i=1 · 1:
In conclusion the associated norm jjQkjj · 1.
APPENDIX B
We suppose that there exist two different equilibrium strategy proﬁles: (e Qk; e Q¡k) 2 ASIC
k £ ASIC
¡k and
(b Qk; b Q¡k) 2 ASIC
k £ ASIC
¡k , such that (e Qk; e Q¡k) 6= (b Qk; b Q¡k). Then the condition given in the theorem,
C > 0 is met for the particular choice of (Q0
k;Q0
¡k) = (e Qk; e Q¡k) and (Q00
k;Q00
¡k) = (b Qk; b Q¡k).
By the deﬁnition of the Nash Equilibrium, the strategies e Qk, k 2 K, are the solutions of the following
maximization problems:
max
Qk2ASIC
k
uk(Qk; e Q¡k):
Thus, e Qk satisfy the following Kuhn-Tucker optimality conditions:
1) e Qk 2 ASIC
k , which means that:
8
> <
> :
e Q
(¼)
k = (e Q
(¼)
k )H º 0 ;8¼ 2 PK
X
¼2PK
p¼Tr(e Q
(¼)
k ) · ntPk;
2) There exist e ¸k ¸ 0, and the following Hermitian non-negative matrices of rank 1, e ©
(¼)
k , for all ¼ 2 PK,
such that:
8
> > <
> > :
e ¸k
"
X
¼2PK
p¼Tr(e Q
(¼)
k ) ¡ ntPk
#
= 0
Tr(e ©
(¼)
k e Q
(¼)
k ) = 0 ;8¼ 2 PK;
3) 8
<
:
8¼ 2 PK :
rQ
(¼)
k uk(e Qk; e Q¡k) = p¼e ¸kI ¡ e ©
(¼)
k
;
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Having assumed that (b Qk; b Q¡k) is also a Nash Equilibrium, b Qk, with k 2 K are the solution of:
max
Qk2ASIC
k
uk(Qk; b Q¡k);
and thus b Qk satisfy the following Kuhn-Tucker optimality conditions:
4) b Qk 2 ASIC
k , which means that:
8
> <
> :
b Q
(¼)
k = (b Q
(¼)
k )H º 0 ;8¼ 2 PK
X
¼2PK
p¼Tr(b Q
(¼)
k ) · ntPk;
5) There exist b ¸k ¸ 0, k 2 K and the following non-negative, Hermitian matrices of rank 1, b ©
(¼)
k , for all
¼ 2 PK such that:
8
> > <
> > :
b ¸k
"
X
¼2PK
p¼Tr(b Q
(¼)
k ) ¡ ntPk
#
= 0
Tr(b ©
(¼)
k b Q
(¼)
k ) = 0 ;8¼ 2 PK;
6) 8
<
:
8¼ 2 PK :
rQ
(¼)
k uk(b Qk; b Q¡k) = p¼b ¸kI ¡ b ©
(¼)
k
:
Using the third and the sixth optimality conditions, the condition given in (6) becomes:
C =
X
¼2PK
K X
k=1
n
p¼~ ¸kTr(b Q
(¼)
k ) + p¼^ ¸kTr(e Q
(¼)
k ) ¡ p¼~ ¸kTr(e Q
(¼)
k ) ¡ p¼^ ¸kTr(b Q
(¼)
k )¡
Tr(b Q
(¼)
k e ©
(¼)
k ) ¡ Tr(e Q
(¼)
k b ©
(¼)
k ) + Tr(e Q
(¼)
k e ©
(¼)
k ) + Tr(b Q
(¼)
k b ©
(¼)
k )
o
·
K X
k=1
(
~ ¸k
"
X
¼2PK
p¼Tr(b Q
(¼)
k ) ¡ ntPk
#
+ ^ ¸k
"
X
¼2PK
p¼Tr(e Q
(¼)
k ) ¡ ntPk
#)
· 0:
From the other four K-T conditions, we obtain that all the terms on the right are negative and thus C · 0. But
this contradicts the diagonally strict concavity condition and so the Nash Equilibrium is unique.
APPENDIX C
We want to prove that the trace inequality (9) is veriﬁed for 1 £ 1 matrices that is, for positive scalars. In
the scalar case we have:
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TK =
K X
k=1
(ak ¡ bk)
Ã
k X
`=1
1
b`
¡
k X
`=1
1
a`
!
> 0: (28)
First, we prove by induction that for all real numbers xi 2 R we have:
RK =
K X
i=1
i¡1 X
j=1
xixj +
K X
i=1
x2
i ¸ 0: (29)
It is easy to see that R1 = x2
1 ¸ 0, R2 = x2
1 + x2
2 + x1x2 ¸ 0 for all x1;x2. Now we suppose that
RK¡1 ¸ 0 and we want to prove that RK ¸ 0. We consider RK(xK) as a function of xK. We have that
RK(xK) = RK¡1 + xK
K¡1 X
i=1
xi + x2
K. Thus we have limxK!¡1 RK = +1, limxK!+1 RK = +1 and the
ﬁrst derivative R0
K(xK) = 2xK +
K¡1 X
i=1
xi. Thus the minimum is given by xK = ¡1
2
K¡1 X
i=1
xi. It is easy to check
that RK(xK) = 1
2
K¡1 X
i=1
x2
i +
1
4
Ã
K¡1 X
i=1
xi
!2
¸ 0. In conclusion ,(29) holds for all K ¸ 1.
As a second step, we prove by induction that for all positive numbers ai, bi:
TK ¸
K X
i=1
(ai ¡ bi)2 +
K X
i=1
i¡1 X
j=1
(ai ¡ bi)(aj ¡ bj)
Ã
K X
i=1
ai
!Ã
K X
i=1
bi
! : (30)
For K = 1, we see that T1 =
(a1¡b1)2
a1b1 which is positive. Now we assume that the trace inequality holds for
as um of K ¡ 1 terms
TK¡1 ¸
K¡1 X
i=1
(ai ¡ bi)2 +
K¡1 X
i=1
i¡1 X
j=1
(ai ¡ bi)(aj ¡ bj)
Ã
K¡1 X
i=1
ai
!Ã
K¡1 X
i=1
bi
! (31)
and want to prove it is true for a sum with K terms. We observe that: TK = TK¡1 +
K X
i=1
(ai ¡ bi)(aK ¡ bK)
0
B B
@
K X
i=1
ai
1
C C
A
0
B B
@
K X
i=1
bi
1
C C
A
.
Using the fact that the denominator of TK¡1 is positive (follows directly from the ﬁrst step (29)) and aK ¸ 0,
bK ¸ 0 we obtain:
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TK ¸
K¡1 X
i=1
(ai ¡ bi)2 +
K¡1 X
i=1
i¡1 X
j=1
(ai ¡ bi)(aj ¡ bj) +
K X
i=1
(ai ¡ bi)(aK ¡ bK)
Ã
K X
i=1
ai
!Ã
K X
i=1
bi
! (32)
and then by direct calculation we obtain the desired result in (30). Therefore, to prove (28) we use (30) where
we observe that the denominator of the right term is always positive from (29).
APPENDIX D
We want to prove that there is no optimality loss when restricting the search for the optimal covariance
matrices to Qk 2 ASIC
k such that Q
(¼)
k = WkP
(¼)
k WH
k , for all ¼ 2 PK. Let us consider user k 2 K. We have
that:
arg max
Qk2ASIC
k
uk(Qk;Q¡k)
= arg max
Qk2ASIC
k
8
<
:
X
¼2PK
p¼Elog2
¯ ¯
¯ ¯ ¯
¯
I + ½HkQ
(¼)
k HH
k + ½
X
`2K
(¼)
k
H`Q
(¼)
` HH
`
¯ ¯
¯ ¯ ¯
¯
9
=
;
= arg max
Qk2ASIC
k
8
<
:
X
¼2PK
p¼Elog2
¯ ¯
¯ ¯ ¯
¯
I + ½V ~ HkWH
k Q
(¼)
k Wk ~ HH
k VH + ½
X
`2K
(¼)
k
V ~ H`WH
` Q
(¼)
` W` ~ HH
` VH
¯ ¯
¯ ¯ ¯
¯
9
=
;
= arg max
Qk2ASIC
k
8
<
:
X
¼2PK
p¼Elog2
¯
¯ ¯ ¯
¯ ¯
I + ½~ HkWH
k Q
(¼)
k Wk ~ HH
k + ½
X
`2K
(¼)
k
~ H`WH
` Q
(¼)
` W` ~ HH
`
¯
¯ ¯ ¯
¯ ¯
9
=
;
= arg max
Qk2ASIC
k
8
<
:
X
¼2K
(¼)
k
Elog2
¯ ¯ ¯
¯ ¯ ¯
I + ½~ HkX
(¼)
k ~ HH
k + ½
X
`2K
(¼)
k
~ H`WH
` Q
(¼)
` W` ~ HH
`
¯ ¯ ¯
¯ ¯ ¯
9
=
;
;
(33)
where we denoted with X
(¼)
k , WH
k Q
(¼)
k Wk. Knowing that the utility function is concave w.r.t. the new
deﬁned matrices X
(¼)
k , and the channel matrix Hk has independent entries, we can directly apply the results
given in [22] to prove that annulling the non-diagonal entries of X
(¼)
k can only increase the values of the
functions Elog2
¯ ¯
¯ ¯ ¯
¯
I + ½~ HkX
(¼)
k ~ HH
k + ½
X
`2K
(¼)
k
~ H`WH
` Q
(¼)
` W` ~ HH
`
¯ ¯
¯ ¯ ¯
¯
. In conclusion the optimal matrices X
(¼)
k are
diagonal, that we will denote with P
(¼)
k . The spectral decomposition of the optimal covariance matrices are:
Q
(¼)
k = WkP
(¼)
k WH
k .
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